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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge: 
 
Appellant Jorge Torres was sentenced on his plea of 
guilty to one count of bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 1344. On appeal, he has raised various challenges to the 
sentence that was imposed, most bottomed on his 
contentions that he was sentenced as if the fraud had been 
successful, when it was not, and there was no actual loss. 
We have considered the issues he has raised andfind them 
to be without merit. Because, however, two of the issues 
addressed to Torres' attempted but unsuccessful fraud as 
well as the issue of how explicit a district court must be 
regarding a defendant's ability to pay a fine recur with 
some frequency in the district courts of this Circuit (and, by 
extension, in this Court), we will discuss them, albeit briefly.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Torres also contends that he should not have received a two-level 
increase in the offense level because his offense did not involve "more 
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I. Background 
 
On September 14, 1997, Jorge Torres, identifying himself 
as George Boyd, opened a money market account at the 
Cottman Avenue branch of the Commonwealth Bank in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He presented photo 
 
identification displaying a picture of himself and a non- 
issued social security number. Ten days later, Torres, again 
posing as Boyd, returned to the Cottman Avenue branch 
and opened a second money market account in the name of 
Kelly Services, Inc. He presented a license in Boyd's name 
"c/o Kelly" from the Department of Licenses and Inspection 
and deposited a subsequently dishonored $240.65 third 
party check made payable to Kelly Services. On the same 
day, at the Port Richmond branch of the Commonwealth 
Bank, another individual using Boyd's name (surveillance 
cameras indicate that it was not Torres) deposited a stolen 
U.S. Treasury check in the amount of $66,021.94 and 
payable to Kelly Services into the Kelly Services account. An 
investigation subsequently established that Torres' 
fingerprint was on the deposit slip used in that transaction. 
The following day, Torres, yet again claiming to be Boyd, 
appeared at the Castor Avenue branch of the 
Commonwealth Bank and attempted to withdraw $24,900 
from the Kelly Services account. The bank refused to permit 
the withdrawal, advising Torres that the funds were 
unavailable. Either shortly before or shortly thereafter, the 
bank came to suspect that the account was fraudulent. It 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
than minimal planning." See U.S.S.G.S 2F1.1(b)(2)(A). " `More than 
minimal planning' means more planning than is typical for commission 
of the offense in a simple form' and is `deemed present in any case 
involving repeated acts over a period of time, unless it is clear that 
each 
 
instance was surely opportune.' " U.S.S.G.S 1B1.1, comment (n.1(f)). 
Because generally a finding of more than minimal planning is fact 
specific and because the facts of this case compel the conclusion that 
more than minimal planning was involved, we will not further discuss 
this issue. Nor will we discuss Torres' contention that, because he did 
not profit from the fraud and there was no actual loss, he should have 
but did not receive a downward departure. Where, as here, the District 
Court understood that it had the ability to depart but refused to do so, 
we lack jurisdiction to review that refusal. See United States v. 
McQuilkin, 97 F.3d 723, 729 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1253 
(1997). 
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notified the authorities, and Torres was subsequently 
arrested. 
 
On September 29, 1998, a grand jury in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania indicted Torres on one count of 
bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1344. On November 
17, 1998, Torres pled guilty and a Presentence Investigation 
Report ("PSR") was prepared. The PSR noted that the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G") called for a 
base offense level of six for a violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1344. 
See U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1. Because the attempted loss was 
$66,262.59, i.e. more than $40,000 but less than $70,000, 
the base offense level was increased by five levels pursuant 
to U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(b)(1)(F). Another two levels were added 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(b)(2)(A) because the offense 
involved repeated acts over a period of time, and two levels 
were deducted pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 3E.1.1(a) because 
Torres accepted responsibility for the offense to which he 
pled guilty. 
 
Based on a total offense level of eleven and a criminal 
history category of I, Torres' guideline range was eight to 
fourteen months imprisonment. At the sentencing hearing 
on February 8, 1999, Torres objected to the five level 
increase for loss in the amount of $66,262.59, contending 
that the correct loss figure should be $24,900 with only a 
four level increase. He argued, as well, that his actions 
constituted an attempt warranting only a three level 
increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 2X1.1(b)(1) and did not 
involve repeated acts over a period of time. 
 
The District Court rejected each of Torres' objections and 
denied his motion for a downward departure. Having ruled 
on the objections, the Court "adopted the recommended 
findings of facts in the presentence investigation report as 
the findings of facts of the Court." 
 
Sentence was thereafter imposed as follows: 
 
       [T]he defendant, Jorge Torres, is hereby committed to 
       the custody of the Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned 
       for a term of 12 months. That sentence shall be a split 
       sentence, pursuant to Section 5(c)1.1 of the sentencing 
       guidelines. The defendant shall spend six months in 
       custody and the balance of the sentence shall be spent 
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       in a community confinement institution to be 
       designated by the Bureau of Prisons. 
 
Torres was also sentenced to a five year term of supervised 
release and a $5,000 fine. He appealed. 
 
Torres, still in prison after having served more than seven 
months, filed a "Motion for Clarification of Split Sentence 
and Immediate Release on Home Confinement." He argued, 
not surprisingly and with considerable force, that the 
District Court's remarks at sentencing and the sentence 
imposed clearly indicated that he serve six months in jail 
and six months in community confinement. If that was the 
sentence the Court intended to impose, we note, it did it 
wrong by not sentencing Torres to the custody of the 
Bureau of Prisons for six months rather than twelve, with 
the remaining six months in community confinement as a 
condition of supervised release. Be that as it may, the 
Court denied Torres' motion, stating that it sentenced 
Torres to twelve months imprisonment and only 
recommended to the Bureau of Prisons that the last six 
months be served in a community confinement facility. 
Torres again appealed and, in little more than a passing 
comment, suggests only that he disagrees with the Court's 
decision not to have immediately released him on home 
confinement. Whatever the District Court's intent at 
sentencing may have been, however, the fact remains, and 
fact it be, that both orally and in the written Judgment, the 
Court sentenced Torres to the custody of the Bureau of 
Prisons for twelve months, not six. Given that sentence, we 
will affirm without further discussion the denial of Torres' 
motion and will address only Torres' appeal from the 
Judgment of February 8, 1999.2 
 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
S 3231. We have jurisdiction pursuant 18 U.S.C. S 3742(a) 
and (e) and 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We exercise plenary review of 
the District Court's legal construction of the Sentencing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. That appeal and the appeal from the Judgment have been 
consolidated by this Court for briefing and disposition. 
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Guidelines. See United States v. Medeiros, 884 F.2d 75, 78 
(3d Cir. 1989). Factual determinations and offense level 
calculations are reviewed under the clearly erroneous 
standard. See United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220 (3d 
Cir.) cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949 (1991); United States v. 
Cianscewski, 894 F.2d 74, 82 (3d Cir. 1990). Where a 
defendant has not raised an issue at sentencing, the 
standard of review is plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). 
 
III. Discussion 
 
A. Amount of Loss 
 
The District Court found, as had the PSR, that the loss 
was $66,262.59, i.e. the amount of the stolen check 
deposited into the Kelly Services account -- $66,021.94 -- 
plus the amount of the bad check used to open the account 
-- $240.65. Torres contends that the loss was $24,900, i.e. 
the amount of the attempted withdrawal. Torres is wrong. 
As this Court has stated on numerous occasions, and as 
the Commentary to U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1 at note 8 provides, the 
Guidelines sweep in not only actual loss but intended loss, 
if that amount can be determined and is higher than actual 
loss: 
 
       This Court's precedents establish that `fraud loss is, in 
       the first instance, the amount of money the victim has 
       actually lost.' However, `if an intended loss that the 
       defendant was attempting to inflict can be determined, 
       this figure will be used if it is greater than actual loss.' 
 
United States v. Yeaman, 194 F.3d 442, 456 (3d Cir. 
1999)(emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Coyle, 63 
F.3d 1239, 1250-51 (3d Cir. 1995) & Application Note 7 
(now Application Note 8) to S U.S.S.G. 2F1.1); see also 
United States v. Holloman, 981 F.2d 690, 693 (3d Cir. 
1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 907 (1993); United States v. 
Schneider, 930 F.2d 555, 558 (7th Cir. 1991)(" `loss' within 
the meaning of the Guidelines includes intended, probable, 
or otherwise expected loss, a qualification of vital 
importance in a case such as this where the fraud is 
discovered or otherwise interrupted before the victim has 
been fleeced"). 
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Torres' activities in connection with the accounts leave 
little or no doubt that the "intended, probable, or otherwise 
expected loss" here was for the full amount fraudulently 
deposited. Within a two week period of time, in two 
accounts neither of which was in Torres' name or the name 
of a company he had anything to do with, three branches 
of the same bank were hit by Torres and a cohort with a 
rubber check, a stolen check, and an attempted withdrawal 
of more than one-third of those fraudulent deposits. It was 
eminently reasonable for the District Court to infer that 
Torres intended to withdraw the balance of the deposits 
before the stolen check surfaced as stolen and would have 
done so had he not been arrested. As the Seventh Circuit 
put it, on similar facts, 
 
       The S 2F1.1 commentary thus anticipates precisely the 
       sort of situation presented in the instant case: a 
       defendant who clearly intended to inflict a loss on his 
       victim much greater than the `actual' loss time and 
       circumstances (i.e., his arrest) permitted him to exact. 
       In those situations, the Guidelines make clear that the 
       defendant should be held accountable for the full 
       amount of the loss he was prepared to inflict. 
 
United States v. Strozier, 981 F.2d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 
The correct measure of loss, therefore, was the entire 
amount that Torres fraudulently deposited in the Kelly 
Services account, regardless of the fact that he was 
prevented from making his first withdrawal. Thus, the 
District Court did not err in upwardly adjusting byfive 
levels for loss greater than $40,000 but less than $70,000, 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(b)(1)(F). 
 
B. Attempt 
 
Torres argues, next, that even if the loss figure was 
properly calculated, because the withdrawal of the $24,900 
and, thus, the completion of the offense were thwarted, his 
actions constituted only an incomplete attempt to defraud 
the bank of the full amount of the loss, warranting a three 
level reduction under U.S.S.G. S 2X1.1: 
 
       If an attempt, decrease by 3 levels, unless the 
       defendant completed all the acts the defendant believed 
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       necessary for successful completion of the substantive 
       offense or the circumstances demonstrate that the 
       defendant was about to complete all such acts but for 
       apprehension or interruption by some similar event 
       beyond the defendant's control. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 2X1.1(b)(1). See also U.S.C.G. S 2B1.1 comment 
(n.2). 
 
We cannot ignore the fact that Torres pled guilty to the 
substantive, completed offense of bank fraud, and not to a 
mere attempt. But even aside from that important fact, 
when Torres' argument is considered solely under 
S 2X1.1(b)(1), which is all that he asks this Court to do, the 
simple answer is two-fold: first, as to the $24,900 
attempted withdrawal, Torres had "completed all the acts 
[he] believed necessary"; and, second, as to the balance of 
the fraudulently deposited funds, the "circumstances 
demonstrate" that he "was about to complete all such acts" 
and was unsuccessful only because the bank was fortunate 
enough to suspect fraudulent activity such that Torres was 
subsequently arrested, and not because of any event within 
Torres' control. 
 
This conclusion is reached along the same lines that we 
followed in determining the amount of the intended loss 
under S 2F1.1, the guideline which concededly governs 
Torres' offense. As the Strozier Court observed, "The 
framers of the Guidelines noted this similarity themselves: 
the critical language concerning the defendant's`intended 
loss' in the S 2F1.1 commentary is preceded by the words, 
`[c]onsistent with the provisions of S 2X1.1 (Attempt, 
Solicitation or Conspiracy) . . . .' And so the defendant's 
arguments have brought us full circle." Strozier, 981 F.2d 
at 286. 
 
The District Court did not err in rejecting Torres' request 
for a three level reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G. 
S 2X1.1(b)(1). 
 
C. Imposition of the $5,000 Fine 
 
The Guidelines provide that the "court shall impose a fine 
in all cases, except where the defendant establishes that he 
is unable to pay and is not likely to become able to pay any 
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 fine." U.S.S.G. S 5E1.2(a). The defendant has the burden of 
proving his or her inability to pay. See United States v. 
Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1212 (3d Cir.)(citing U.S.S.G. 
S 5E1.2(a)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1086 (1995). A 
sentencing court must consider an array of factors, 
including evidence of the defendant's ability to pay the fine 
and to pay that fine over a period of time, his or her future 
earning capacity, any restitution or reparation that the 
defendant has made or is obligated to make, the burden 
that the fine will impose upon the defendant and others 
who are financially dependent on the defendant, and "any 
other pertinent equitable considerations." U.S.S.G. 
S 5E1.2(d); see also 18 U.S.C. S 3572(a); 18 U.S.C. 
S 3553(a); United States v. Seale, 20 F.3d 1279, 1284 (3d 
Cir. 1994). 
 
The Guidelines contain a "fine table" which establishes a 
minimum and maximum fine based on the defendant's 
offense level. Based upon a total offense level of 11, Torres 
was subject to a fine in the range of $2,000 to $1,000,000. 
See U.S.S.G. S 5E1.2 (c)(4). The District Court found that 
this was the appropriate range "provided the defendant has 
the ability to pay the fine." Torres did not object to the 
range or to the facts in the PSR which enabled the 
probation officer to conclude that he could pay afine within 
the appropriate range, arguing through counsel only that 
because "he's obviously not working [and] he has a wife and 
a child to support [, a] fine would be an undue hardship." 
The Court thereafter imposed sentence, including a $5,000 
fine to be paid in equal monthly installments over Torres' 
five year period of supervised release. 
 
It is important to highlight what Torres does not argue, 
and what he does. He does not argue that the District 
Court did not consider his ability -- or lack thereof -- to 
pay a fine. Nor does he argue that the PSR did not contain 
sufficiently detailed information about his financial 
condition and earning capacity or that any of that 
information was wrong. All he argues, citing that same 
concededly correct information, is that the record before the 
District Court did not establish whether he had the earning 
capacity to pay a fine while on supervised release. Torres is 
wrong. 
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Where, as here, a defendant did not at sentencing raise 
the issue of his or her inability to pay, a sentencing court's 
decision to impose a fine and the amount of thefine is 
reviewed for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). And 
where, again as here, a defendant, whose burden it was to 
prove his or her inability to pay by a preponderance of the 
evidence, made utterly no showing in that regard and took 
no issue with facts of record showing an ability to pay, 
error sufficient to warrant relief must be very plain, indeed. 
 
Which brings us to Torres' "the record did not establish" 
argument which we construe as a challenge to the fact that 
the District Court did not make specific findings showing 
that the factors which touch on a defendant's ability to pay 
were considered. It is, of course, a requirement in this 
Circuit that findings be made regarding a defendant's 
ability to pay a fine or that a factual record be created such 
that it can be said that the Court considered the issue. See, 
e.g., Seale, 20 F.3d at 1284; United States v. Demes, 941 
F.2d 220, 223 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949 (1991). 
While Torres is correct that the District Court did not 
explicitly find an ability to pay, it surely implicitly did so 
when it stated that it could impose a fine within the 
guideline range only if Torres had the ability to pay that 
fine, and thereafter imposed a fine; when it indicated in the 
Statement of Reasons section of the Judgment that the fine 
was not "waived or below the guideline range because of 
inability to pay" and the interest requirement on the fine 
was not waived or modified because of an inability to pay; 
and, most importantly, when it adopted the facts set forth 
in the PSR. 
 
Those facts as relevant to the fine, facts with which 
Torres not only took no issue at sentencing but takes no 
issue before us, clearly indicate that Torres' earning 
capacity upon his release from prison would be more than 
sufficient to pay the fine on an installment basis, pay off 
some or all of his debts, and support his family. Torres, 
twenty-one years old at that time of sentencing, received a 
high school degree in 1995 and satisfied the requirements 
for an associates degree in computer science at a college in 
the Dominican Republic. He reads, writes and speaks four 
languages. He has held several short-term positions, such 
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as bartender, car salesman, and credit manager, and has 
served in the U.S. Army Reserves. He is able-bodied and in 
good health, with no history of mental or emotional 
problems or any drug or alcohol abuse. 
 
As explained in the PSR, if upon release Torres held a 
forty-hour per week job at the minimum wage of $5.15 per 
hour, he would earn $892.66 per month, or $10,712 per 
year. Allowing 80% of this sum for subsistence results in 
$178.50 per month, or $2,142 per year for payment of any 
fine, restitution not being applicable in this case. 
Accordingly, Torres would be capable of paying thefine in 
less than three years while providing subsistence for his 
family in addition to that provided by his wife, who works 
as a waitress. The District Court allowed him to pay the 
fine in monthly installments over a five year period, 
moreover, which provided ample room for Torres to satisfy 
in whole or in part those obligations which had not been 
charged off or classified as bad debts. 
 
Given that Torres offered nothing beyond counsel's 
fleeting reference to the fact that Torres, not then working 
because he was in prison, "has a wife and a child to 
support," he failed to carry the "burden of persuasion (and, 
logically, the burden of production) . . . on the issue of his 
financial resources and needs." United States v. Voigt, 89 
F.3d 1050, 1093 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1047 
(1996) (restitution under Victim and Witness Protection 
Act). That aside, this Court's requirement of specific 
findings will be satisfied if the District Court adopts a PSR 
which contains adequate factual findings with reference to 
an ability to pay such that there can be effective appellate 
review. See United States v. Hallman, 23 F.3d 821, 827 (3d 
Cir.) cert. denied, 513 U.S. 881 (1994) (rejecting claim that 
the District Court failed to make specific findings with 
reference to ability to pay restitution where it adopted the 
specific findings of the PSR). See also United States v. 
Castner, 50 F.3d 1267, 1277 (4th Cir. 1995). Because the 
unchallenged facts in the PSR supported the imposition of 
a fine within the guideline range, and because the District 
Court adopted the facts of the PSR, there was no error in 
imposing that fine without specific findings, much less 
plain error. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
For the reasons given, the judgments of the District 
Court of February 8, 1999 and May 28, 1999 will be 
affirmed. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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